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A federal system of government must always face the problem of main­
taining an appropriate balance of power among its component units of govern­
ment. A current trend in this respect involves a movement to shift fiscal 
power from the federal government to state and local governments under what 
can generally be called "Fiscal Federalism."^ The State and Local Fiscal 
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Assistance Act of 1972 --better known as the general revenue sharing act--is 
one of the landmark events which attempts to promote this shift of fiscal re­
sponsibility to state and local units of government. Although this shift in 
fiscal responsibility will affect both state and local units of government, 
this thesis will only examine the implications of the revenue sharing pro­
gram in terms of how it relates to local units of government. 
The theoretical basis for the involvement of the federal government in 
state and local financial activities stems from two basic concepts: effi­
ciency and equity. The term "efficiency" refers to the ability of state and 
local governments to provide an adequate amount of services to their local 
populace. The ability of these units of government to supply needed services 
to their constituents is often affected by two phenomena known as "intergov­
ernmental spillovers" and "fragmentation." As a result of "intergovernmental 
spillovers," many units of local government are reluctant to supply services 
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at levels capable of fulfilling the needs of their constituents. For 
example, a local government, by providing an educational system, is likely 
to provide benefits to immigrants from other surrounding communities. In 
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addition, persons educated in one jurisdiction, by transferring to another 
community following graduation, will transfer the educational benefits of 
the original community to other areas. The spillover effect can lead local 
governments to spend less on local education since the long-run benefits are 
not perceived to accrue to the community. In order to insure that the level 
of education is relatively equal throughout all communities, a higher level 
of government must, in many cases, contribute to the local financing of edu-
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cational services. 
The need for increased federal financial assistance to state and local 
levels of government is often questioned on the basis of how much the aid 
will influence the ability of lower levels of government to make their own 
financial decisions. As John F. Due, Professor of Economics at the Univer­
sity of Illinois, has indicated: 
Division of governmental activities among several levels of govern­
ment requires fragmentation of the overall tax structure in the 
sense that portions of the overall structure are levied and adminis­
tered by several units of government. Fragmentation is necessary if 
each level is to have autonomous financial resources, rather than 
merely serving as an agency to spend money collected by the national 
government.^ 
However, besides allowing financial autonomy, fragmentation also gives rise 
to a number of financial problems. 
By allowing the various units of state and local government to deter­
mine their own tax policies, it is difficult to attain an optimal overall 
tax structure. For example, if one unit of local government determines 
that the best method by which to attract industrial development to the com­
munity is through tax concessions granted to new industry, surrounding gov­
ernmental units will be forced to follow the established concession policy 
in order to compete for new industrial facilities, thus equalizing the 
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effect of the concession. The result of such concessions will be a loss in 
tax receipts without enhancing the potential of the community to compete 
with surrounding areas for new industrial development. 
Fragmentation of the tax structure also results in the duplication of 
many tax administrative and compliance activities among subordinate units of 
government.^ Due to the separation of governmental jurisdictions, many 
overlapping activities are duplicated by different levels of government. 
For example, a personal individual income tax is collected, in most states, 
by both the federal and state governments. This arrangement results in the 
duplication of many administrative activities which could be avoided by a 
combined collection system at either the federal or state level of govern­
ment. However, due to the desire for autonomy at both levels of government, 
compliance is difficult to attain in the combination of services at either 
level of government. 
The term "equity," in relation to intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
refers to the ability of the numerous units of government to collect ade-
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quate revenues to finance the distribution of public goods. If each com­
munity contained an equal distribution of high-, middle- and low-income 
residents, and used identical techniques by which to collect revenue from 
its local populace, an equitable arrangement for the collection and expendi­
ture of local revenues could feasibly exist. However, the distribution of 
population, income class, and tax base among the various units of government 
has created an uneven distribution of public goods. The uneven distribution 
constitutes a theoretical justification for making certain types of inter-
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governmental transfers of funds. 
As Bruce F„ Davie and Bruce F. Duncombe have indicated: 
4 
Some local jurisdictions will find it much more difficult than 
others to raise the revenues required, given the tax base located 
within their boundaries. Raising revenue can be difficult both be­
cause of the concentration of demands for public services placed on 
certain jurisdictions and because of limited tax bases. An area may 
be poor in the sense that incomes, retail sales, property values, 
and other potential tax bases are low, relative to the population. 
A jurisdiction can also be hard-pressed because of extraordinary de­
mands for public services. Demands for police protection, transpor­
tation facilities, health services, and other services to cope with 
the many manifestations of what has come to be called the urban 
crisis, have created municipal overburdens.^ 
In order to offset the inequalities and inefficiences which have re­
sulted from intergovernmental spillovers, fragmentation of local fiscal poli 
cies, and the need to distribute an equitable amount of expenditures through 
out the nation, and at the same time assure local autonomy, the federal 
government has taken the initiative to assist state and local units of gov­
ernment in meeting the needs of their constituents through financial alloca­
tions. The major financial allocations have been in the form of grants-in-
aid and, more recently, general revenue sharing. Under the grant-in-aid 
system, the federal government grants funds to the state and local units of 
government for a particular function to induce it to raise the level of serv 
ices for the particular function. To insure that the recipient of the grant 
does not lower its own contribution to the particular activity, the unit of 
local government is generally required to supply a matching amount of reve­
nue with which to finance the function. This type of grant-in-aid program 
has been typically called the "categorical grant program. The term "cate 
gorical" refers to the fact that the funds can only be used for a particular 
function, such as urban renewal or open space development. If the federal 
government funded a categorical grant program for a local unit of govern­
ment, the community could be required to share the cost of the program 
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on a matching basis. The federal government would supply a certain percent­
age of the funds and the local unit of government would supply the remaining 
portion of the total cost of the particular program. 
All grant-in-aid programs are characterized by a certain measure of 
control over the use of funds. Much debate has resulted over the amount to 
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which controls limit the autonomy of the recipient unit. For example, 
since the grant-in-aid funds must be used to finance a particular function, 
such as urban renewal or open space, local units of government are not al­
lowed to determine the categories of expenditures for the funds. In other 
words, their fiscal decisions are limited. 
Unlike the grant-in-aid programs, revenue sharing does not place 
strict limits on the use of allocated funds. The revenue sharing program is 
not intended to replace all grant-in-aid programs, but to reduce the number 
of programs and, in turn, allow the transfer of more block grants to state 
and local units of government. The present form of revenue sharing used in 
the United States was established by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
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Act of 1972, better known as the general revenue sharing act. As presently 
operated, the general revenue sharing program allocates approximately $30.2 
billion from the annual federal individual income tax receipts to each state 
and local unit of government for a five-year period beginning January 1, 
1972. The state governments retain one-third of the total amount of funds 
allocated to the state, and are unrestricted in the use of funds as long as 
their use is legal under state law, and they are not used as matching funds 
for other federally funded projects. Local units of government in each state 
are entitled to two-thirds of the total allocations to the state, and must 
spend their funds for certain "priority expenditures." The "priority 
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expenditures" as defined by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 
1972 1 4 are: 
a. public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection and 
building code enforcement); 
b. environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation 
and pollution abatement); 





g. social services for the poor or aged; 
h. financial administration; and 
i c ordinary and necessary capital improvements. 
Unlike many of the grant-in-aid programs operated by the federal gov­
ernment, local units of government are not required to solicit general reve­
nue sharing funds through a formal application process. This allows the 
units of government to spend more of their valuable administrative time de­
termining ways in which to spend the funds rather than justifying a need for 
receiving the funds. The general revenue sharing funds are allocated and 
distributed automatically to each unit of local government on a quarterly 
basis. The program is authorized to continue granting funds to the state 
and local units of government through 1976. 
In addition to the general revenue sharing program, there is also a 
current proposal for the adoption of a "special" revenue sharing program. 
Although the program is not finalized at this time, the general feeling is 
that the "special" revenue sharing program will grant sums of money to local 
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units of government for specific classes of use. For example, under the 
"special" revenue sharing program, if a local government receives funds to 
undertake an urban renewal program, the funds can only be used to finance ac­
tivities related to the urban renewal project. The major difference between 
the proposed "special" revenue sharing program and the categorical grant 
programs is that the formal ad hoc application procedure and close supervi­
sion of project activities by governmental agencies will not be required 
under the proposed "special" revenue sharing program. Local units of gov­
ernment will be free to plan and implement activities under the "special" 
revenue sharing program as long as the funds are used to accomplish the ob­
jective of the funding arrangement. For example, if a local unit of govern­
ment receives a grant under the "special" revenue sharing program, the money 
will be allocated to the community for a specific use such as law enforcement 
assistance or urban renewal. The community will be required to use the funds 
for the specific project, but will be free to design its own methods by which 
to spend the funds for the specific program. Thus, the internal requirements 
of the "special" revenue sharing program will be much more flexible than the 
grant-in-aid programs, and will allow local units of government to design 
their own strategies by which to complete projects. 
In summary, the theoretical basis for the transfer of funds from the 
federal to the state and local levels of government stems from two basic 
concepts: efficiency and equity. In order to insure that an adequate 
amount of services is distributed to all segments of the total population, 
regardless of the desire or ability of local units of government to support 
the activities, the need for a higher unit of government to assist local 
units of government in meeting the needs of their constituents has been 
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established. However, the financial assistance which is granted to an area 
is often questioned due to the amount of autonomy, or ability to make finan­
cial decisions, which it can potentially remove from the local units of gov­
ernment . 
Historically, the federal government has sought to assist state and 
local units of government in meeting their financial needs through the use 
of grants-in-aid. However, these programs have received a considerable 
amount of criticism due to the control which the federal government has over 
the use of the grant funds. In reaction to the need to allow local units of 
government a stronger voice in determining the needs of their own communi­
ties through local financial decisions, the revenue sharing concept has 
evolved. The current form of sharing federal funds with state and local 
units of government was established by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Act of 1972, or the general revenue sharing act. The program automatically 
allocates an annual portion of the federal individual income tax receipts to 
state and local units of government, with relatively no restrictions of the 
use of funds. Thus, state and local units of government are given more con­
trol over the ways in which funds are administered throughout their communi­
ties . 
Objective of Thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between 
the expenditure of general revenue sharing funds and established planning 
goals and objectives in localities within a 60-mile radius of the city of 
Atlanta during the first year of fund allocation. Established planning 
goals and objectives are defined as locally adopted policy statements which 
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are intended to guide the expenditure of local funds, or an established list­
ing of priority needs in the community which are used in the allocation of 
local revenue. The federal government's intended use of the funds is com­
pared with the actual use of the funds by localities. Emphasis is placed on 
the extent to which the general revenue sharing program was used to meet the 
established local plans for community growth and development. 
Method of Study 
Information included in this thesis has been obtained from a survey 
of available literature pertaining to revenue sharing. In addition, inter­
views were conducted within a 60-mile radius of the city of Atlanta, Georgia, 
to a purposivesample of mayors, city managers, city clerks, financial of­
ficers, and other individuals directly responsible for the expenditure of 
general revenue sharing funds for the initial funding period of the general 
revenue sharing program. Information obtained from the literature and inter­
views was analyzed in order to test hypotheses concerning the relationship 
between planning and general revenue sharing. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVENUE SHARING AND LOCAL PLANNING 
In order to establish a sound framework for an analysis of the rela­
tionship between revenue sharing and local planning, it will be necessary to 
examine the basic idea of revenue sharing from its inception to the present 
time. The present legal basis for general revenue sharing is the State and 
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which will also be examined in this 
chapter. In addition, ways in which revenue sharing can create a need for 
local planning will also be discussed. 
History of Revenue Sharing 
Most authorities attribute the initial revenue sharing idea to Mr. 
Walter W. Heller. He first advocated the concept in 1964 while serving as 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. The idea was further developed by a task force appointed by Presi­
dent Johnson in 1964, and headed by Joseph A. Pechman, economic director of 
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the Brookings Institute. 
The idea of local units of government obtaining a greater share of 
federal funds soon gained momentum throughout the nation. Many elected of­
ficials felt that state and local governments were facing serious financial 
difficulties, while the federal government was expected to mount a vast sur­
plus of funds. These officials felt that if the war in Vietnam was ended 
and federal individual income tax receipts continued to rise at present 
rates, the normal growth of the economy and population would continue to 
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increase the annual federal individual income tax collections and create a 
tremendous surplus in federal revenues. They also felt that the state and 
local governments, due to the inelastic nature of their sources of revenue 
(sales and property taxes), would not be able to collect sufficient amounts 
of revenue to finance the demands generated by a rapidly increasing popula­
tion with its demand for increased services.^ Thus, state and local units 
of government felt that the federal government, with its expected surplus of 
revenue, should share the resources with units of government which were hav­
ing the most difficulty in meeting the needs of their constituents. 
Both the Democratic and Republican parties adopted the revenue sharing 
concept, and in 1968 approximately 90 revenue sharing bills were introduced 
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in the 88th Congress of the United States. President Richard Nixon made 
his first formal statement on revenue sharing in August 1969. At that time, 
he emphasized the need to create what he called a "New Federalism." Revenue 
sharing, he felt, would initiate a new federal-state relationship. He felt 
that the sharing of federal funds with state and local units of government 
would advance the decentralization of governmental power and enhance the po­
tential restoration of a balance between national and state units of govern-
19 
ment. 
One of the major events which prompted President Nixon to seek alter­
native methods by which to redistribute federal dollars to state and local 
units of government was the rampant increase in federal grant-in-aid pro-
20 
grams. Prior to the inception of the revenue sharing concept, the main 
method by which the federal government gave financial assistance to state 
21 
and local units of government was through categorical grants. 
The major complaint of the categorical grant-in-aid programs was the 
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amount of federal control exerted over the expenditure of the funds. With 
each of the grant programs there is a certain measure of federal control 
over the use of funds to insure that the recipient unit of government uti­
lizes the funds wisely. Much debate has arisen over the amount of difficulty 
which the controls exert over the autonomy of the recipient unit of govern­
ment. The policy of limiting the amount of federal governmental control 
over the operations of the grant programs to only those controls essential 
for accomplishing the purposes of the grant programs has been difficult to 
interpret. As a result, much criticism of the categorical grant-in-aid pro­
grams has arisen from strict control of expenditure decisions by governmental 
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grant agencies. 
Improperly designed grant programs can lead state and local units of 
government to contribute more than the preferred optimum in order to obtain 
the categorical grant funds and, in turn, to spend less than the optimal 
23 
amounts on other needed activities. For example, if a city is in desper­
ate need of both a new water and sewer system and additional equipment for 
the police and fire departments, and categorical grant funds can only be ob­
tained for the water and sewer improvements, the locality would be reluctant 
not to participate in the grant program. If the grant program required the 
city to use such vast amounts of its funds that it would not be able to make 
the needed improvements to the police and fire departments, the city would 
be forced to contribute less than the optimal amount of funds to the police 
and fire departments in order to capitalize on the grant funds. 
President Nixon felt that revenue sharing--a relatively unrestricted 
source of federal funds--was one of the best methods by which to halt, or at 
least curb the increasing array of categorical grant-in-aid programs. The 
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major thrust of his proposal was to simplify the structure of federal aid to 
states and local units of government in order to bring it under control and 
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reduce the amount of wasted funds. The idea of wasted funds refers to 
both the vast amounts of revenue required to administer the categorical 
grant programs, and the tremendous amounts of money which local units of 
government were spending in order to match greater amounts of federal dol­
lars. Under the revenue sharing program, local governments are not required 
to match federal funds, thus allowing them to spend revenue without being 
persuaded to undertake uaneeded projects in order to obtain a greater amount 
of matching funds. 
In addition to reducing wasted funds caused by the categorical grant-
in-aid programs, the revenue sharing program was also considered an ideal 
method by which to ease state and local fiscal tensions. On the revenue 
side, local units of government are meeting increased resistance from tax­
payers as they increase local tax collections to supply needed services. On 
the expenditure side, the increasing demands for more governmentally supplied 
services place tremendous expenditure pressures on these units of government. 
It was felt that the revenue sharing program could relieve much of the ten­
sion created by the resistance to increasing taxes and the increasing demand 
for services by providing funds for the initiation of needed services with-
25 
out requiring increases in locally collected taxes. 
Through a maze of state, local, and congressional input and debate, 
and three U.S. Presidents, Public Law 92-512--better known as the State and 
2 6 
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 or the General Revenue Sharing A c t -
was passed by the 92nd Congress of the United States on October 20, 1972. 
While the act's history and the general revenue sharing concept are 
14 
relatively new, the need for a viable means by which to allow local units of 
government to plan and finance their own destinies without making additional 
demands on the local populace is long overdue. 
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Revenue Sharing Legislation 
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972—Public Law 92-
512--was signed by both house of Congress on October 20, 1972. The act is 
the official justification for the dispersal of approximately $30.2 billion 
in general revenue sharing funds to state and local units of government. 
The funds will be dispersed over a five-year period beginning January 1, 
1972. 
Title I of the act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to pay 
out of a Trust Fund a predetermined amount of revenue to each state and unit 
of local government. Each state government is entitled to receive one-third 
of the total funds allocated to that state. The remaining two-thirds of the 
total state allocation must be distributed among units of local government 
within the state. 
Use of Funds 
As stated in Section 103 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 
of 1972, local governments may only spend general revenue sharing funds for 
"priority expenditures." The term "priority expenditures" is defined as: 
1. ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses for: 
a. Public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, 
and building code enforcement); 
b. environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanita­
tion, and pollution abatement); 
15 





g. social services for the poor and aged; and 
h. financial administration. 
2. ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law. 
The state and local units of government are strictly forbidden from 
using funds as matching contributions for federally funded projects under­
taken in the jurisdiction. Should the Secretary of the Treasury determine 
that funds have been used for matching capital, the state or local unit of 
government will be required to repay to the United States Government an 
amount equal to the funds which have been misused. 
Trust Fund for Appropriations 
The general revenue sharing act has established on the books of the 
Treasury of the United States, a trust fund to be used for the purpose of re­
taining revenue sharing funds. The money held in the trust fund is to be 
used only for the payment of revenue sharing funds to state and local govern­
ments. The money deposited in the trust fund is appropriated out of amounts 
in the general fund of the Treasury attributable to the collections of the 
federal individual income taxes not otherwise appropriated. 
Allocations Among States 
The amount of funds allocated to each state for any entitlement peri­
od is determined by either the Three or Five Factor Formula. Utilizing the 
Three Factor Formula, the amount of funds paid during each entitlement 
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period is the amount which bears the same ratio to $5,300,000,000 as the 
population of that state, multiplied by the relative income factor of that 
state, bears to the sum of the products determined for all states. 
The amount allocable to a state under the Five Factor Formula for any 
entitlement period is the amount to which the state would be entitled if: 
1. one-third of $3,500,000,000 were allocated among the states on 
the basis of urbanized population; 
2. one-third of $3,500,000,000 were allocated among the states on 
the basis of population; 
3. one-third of $3,503,000,000 were allocated among the states on 
the basis of population inversely weighted for per capita income; 
4. one-half of $1,800,000,000 were allocated among the states on the 
basis of income tax collections; and 
5. one-half of $1,800,000,000 were allocated among the states on the 
basis of general tax effort. 
The Three Factor Formula is used to calculate the state's share of 
the total funds unless the state will receive more money by utilizing the 
Five Factor Formula. 
Definitions of Terms Used in Calculating Formulas 
The definition of each term used in calculating the allocations for 
state and local units of government is as follows: 
Population of State. The population of each state is determined 
on the same basis as resident population is determined by the Bureau of the 
Census for general statistical purposes. 
2. Urbanized Population. Urbanized population is defined as the 
population of any area consisting of a central city or cities of 50,000 or 
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more inhabitants--and of the surrounding closely settled territory for such 
city or cities--which is treated as an urbanized area by the Bureau of the 
Census for general statistical purposes. 
3. General Tax Effort Factor. The general tax effort factor of any 
state for any entitlement period is the net amount collected from the state 
and local taxes of such state during the most recent reporting year, divided 
by the aggregate personal income of such state for the same period. 
4. Relative Income Factor. The relative income factor for a state 
is a fraction, the numerator of which is the per capita income of the United 
States and the denominator of which is the per capita income of the state. 
5. Income Tax Amount. The income tax amount of any state for an en­
titlement period is 15 percent of the net amount collected from the state 
individual income tax of the state during 1972 or (if later) during the last 
calendar year ending before the beginning of such entitlement period. 
6. Population Inversely Weighted for Per Capita Income. An alloca­
tion to the states on the basis of population inversely weighted for per 
capita income is made by allocating to each state an amount which bears the 
same ratio to the total amount to be allocated as the population of such 
state, multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the per capita 
income of all the states and the denominator of which is the per capita in­
come of such state, bears to the sum of the products determined for all the 
states. 
In order to insure that the general revenue sharing program is equally 
administered to all state and local units of government, these definitions 
are used in the allocation calculations for all units of government. 
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Allocations Among County and Local Governments 
The amount of general revenue sharing funds allocated to the units of 
local government within a state for an entitlement period is allocated among 
the county areas located in each state. Each county area receives an amount 
which bears the same ratio to the total amount to be allocated to the units 
of local government within the state as the population of the county area, 
multiplied by the general tax effort factor of the county area, bears to the 
sum of the products for all county areas within the state. For example, if 
the total allocation for a particular state was $15,000, the total popula­
tion of the county area was 25,000 residents, the total adjusted taxes for 
the county area was $2,000,000, the total income of all residents within all 
jurisdictions of the county area was $200,000,000, the per capita income of 
all residents of the state was $3,000, and the per capita income of the 
county area residents was $4,000, the computation of the local county's 
share of the total state allocations to the county areas would be as indi­
cated in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Computation of County Area General 
Revenue Sharing Allocations 
State Allocation = $15,000 
One-third to State = $5,000 
Two-thirds to all County Areas = $10,000 
(Total adjusted taxes of all jurisdic- (General 
(1) $2,000,000 tions within county = .01 Tax Ef-
$200,000,000 (Total income of all residents within fort) 
jurisdiction of county area) 
(Per capita income of all residents, of (Relative 
(2) $3,000 state) = > 7 5 per capita 
$4,000 (Per capita income of all residents of income) 
county area) 
(population of (general tax (relative per capita 
(3) 25,000 county area) x .01 effort) x .75 income) 
= 250 (county area product) 
250 (County area product) 
(4) + 
7,750 (Products of all other county areas in state) 
8,000 (SuiTiv of products for all county areas in state) 
(5) 250 (County area product) = .03125 (County area allocation factor) 
8,000 (Sum of products for 
all county areas) 
(6) $10,000 (Allocations for all county areas within state) 
x 
.03125 (County area allocation factor) 
$ 521 (County area allocation) 
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The county government is allocated that portion of the amount allo­
cated to the county area for the entitlement period which bears the same 
ratio to such amount as the adjusted taxes of the county government bear to 
the adjusted taxes of the county government and all other units of local 
government located in the county area. 
Revenue sharing funds which remain for allocation in a county area 
after funds have been granted to county governments are allocated among the 
units of local government (other than the county government and township 
governments) located in the county area. Each unit of local government re­
ceives an amount which bears the same ratio to the total amount to be allo­
cated to all such units as the population of the local government, multiplied 
by the general tax effort factor of that local government, multiplied by the 
relative income factor of the local government, bears to the sum of the . 
products of all such units. 
If the county area includes one or more township governments, then 
before allocations are made to county governments there is set aside for al­
locations to such township government that portion of the amount allocated to 
the county area for the entitlement period which bears the same ratio to 
such amount as the sum of the adjusted taxes of all such township govern­
ments bears to the aggregate adjusted taxes of the county government, such 
township governments, and all other units of local government located in the 
county area. In addition, that portion of each amount set aside for each 
township government is allocated to each township government on the same 
basis as amounts are allocated to units of local government. 
In summary, two-thirds of the total amount of general revenue sharing 
funds allocated to each state is granted to their county, local and township 
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units of government. The funds are granted to each county area based on the 
total population and general tax effort of the particular county. The amount 
of funds allocated to each county area is distributed among the county gov­
ernment (the unincorporated portion of the county area), the local units of 
government within the county area, and the township units of government 
within each county area. Allocations among local units of government within 
each county area are based on the population, general tax effort, and rela­
tive income of each unit of government. 
Reporting Use of Revenue Sharing Funds 
Subtitle B, Section 121 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 
of 1972 requires each state and local unit of government which receives 
funds, after the close of each entitlement period, to submit a report to the 
Secretary of the Treasury setting forth the amounts and purposes for which 
revenue sharing funds have been spent or obligated. After January 1, 1973, 
each state and local unit of government which intends to receive revenue 
sharing funds must submit a report to the Secretary of the Treasury setting 
forth the amounts and purposes for which it plans to spend or obligate funds. 
Also, each state and unit of local government is required to publish both re­
ports in a newspaper which is published within the state and has general cir­
culation within the geographic area of the government in question. 
The Relationship of Revenue Sharing to Local Planning 
It is felt that many planners, elected officials, and lawmakers have 
interpreted the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 as a signifi­
cant step toward providing funds with which to implement locally adopted 
plans. However, as with any issue, there are exceptions to the rule. A 
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recent article in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution indicated that "Tennessee 
fiscal officials and lawmakers are beginning to wonder if the so-called 
'Nixon revenue sharing' was not a campaign mirage, 'pie-in-the-sky' campaign 
2 
propaganda, or maybe even a loss in dollars at both state and local levels." 
This objection was prompted by the fact that President Nixon, following the 
passage of the revenue sharing act, halted the flow of much relied upon fed­
eral dollars in the form of grants-in-aid to local and state units of govern­
ment. 
Although the Tennessee officials and lawmakers who cherished the idea 
of flowing federal dollars in the form of grants-in-aid were displeased with 
the recent cut-backs, the grant-in-aid programs were not without their 
faults in terms of planning for the future growth and development of an area. 
Categorical grants have been severely criticized through the years by 
the federal government and recipients alike because, although they provide 
funds, they impose federal priorities on state and local governments and 
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create distortions in the allocation of state and local resources. For 
example, since it has been established through federal categorical grant 
programs that a locality can receive a matching amount of funds for doing 
certain federally approved projects--such as urban renewal and neighborhood 
development programs, park and open space projects, and planned water and 
sewer systems--many localities have avoided undertaking much needed capital 
improvements in order to capitalize on the available funds. The result of 
such action has led many cities to spend more funds on less optimal activi­
ties, and less funds on optimum local improvements which would yield the 
greatest benefit to local residents. In addition, local units of govern­
ment, if the matching funds were not available, have been encouraged to 
23 
generate additional capital through either increased taxes or bond issuances 
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in order to obtain federal matching funds. Such activity can lead to un­
wanted demands placed on the total population of an area for projects which 
will benefit only a certain segment of the community, or fulfill only one of 
the most urgent priority needs of the city. 
The categorical grant-in-aid programs have allowed localities to 
place so much of their planning emphasis on programs which would bring the 
maximum amount of federal dollars into the community that the recent cut­
backs in the grant-in-aid programs have left many cities with unfinished and 
unattainable planned projects. Since the financing of these plans and pro­
grams was predicated on the belief that federal funds would continue to flow 
into their community, the cut-backs have virtually destroyed their hopes for 
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implementation. 
Although the recent cut-backs in several federal grant-in-aid pro­
grams have created a current state of disruption in terms of local planning, 
the revenue sharing program should tend to stimulate the importance of com­
prehensive planning in the years to come. As local units of government re­
gain their trust in the federal government, which has been partially lost due 
to the abrupt cut-back in several federal grant-in-aid programs, the use of 
revenue sharing funds should tend to stimulate a need for planning local im­
provements. Since local governments will receive federal aid under the gen­
eral revenue sharing program without being forced to demand more tax 
collections from the local populace in order to obtain matching federal dol­
lars, the local populace should eventually demand that the funds be used in 
such a manner that will benefit all segments of the community. 
The significance of the two closely related events — the passage of 
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the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 and the cut-backs in sev­
eral federal grant-in-aid programs--in terms of comprehensive planning is 
twofold: (1) localities will no longer be persuaded to avoid needed capital 
improvements in order to undertake projects which will yield a one-half or 
three-fourths matching funds arrangement with the federal government; and 
(2) due to the requirements of Subtitle B, Section 121 of the State and Lo­
cal Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, local units of government will not be re­
quired to examine the future needs of their community, and thus enhance the 
importance and position of comprehensive planning in governmental operations. 
By not being persuaded to forego needed capital improvements in order to ob­
tain matching funds for categorical grant-in-aid programs, cities can plan 
and implement activities which will satisfy the most urgent needs of their 
communities. For example, the general revenue sharing program will grant 
funds to the local units of government with relatively no set requirements 
on the use of funds, other than the "priority expenditures" requirement of 
the act which is broad enough to cover most local needs. Since the funds 
will not force local units of government to select one activity over another 
in order to satisfy the requirements of the general revenue sharing program, 
nor will they be required to increase tax collections from the local popu­
lace in order to obtain a larger amount of federal dollars, the local units 
of government can plan their financial expenditures in view of satisfying 
top priority activities, or planned goals and objectives of the community. 
In addition, as required by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 
of 1972, local units of government must submit an annual financial plan to 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury setting forth the amount of general rev­
enue sharing funds which will be used for particular expenditures in the 
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community. In o r d e r t o program the use of f u t u r e funds , the l o c a l g o v e r n ­
ments w i l l be r e q u i r e d to examine the use of l o c a l c a p i t a l i n terms of s a t ­
i s f y i n g immediate l o c a l needs . By a s s e s s i n g l o c a l needs , i n terms of 
f i n a n c i n g t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t , t h e l o c a l u n i t s of government w i l l be r e q u i r e d 
t o make comparisons among the numerous community n e e d s . The on ly f e a s i b l e 
method by which t o compare a c t i v i t i e s i s t o c o n s i d e r t h e needs i n terms of 
t h e i r degree of s e v e r i t y , which i s , i n e s s e n c e , the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p r i o r i ­
t i e s by which t o determine the e x p e n d i t u r e of r e v e n u e . Thus, by r e q u i r i n g 
the l o c a l u n i t s of government to examine t h e i r f u t u r e needs i n terms of the 
e x p e n d i t u r e of g e n e r a l revenue s h a r i n g funds , the importance of sound f i s c a l 
p lann ing i n l o c a l governmental o p e r a t i o n s w i l l ba enhanced. 
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CHAPTER III 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
The major objective of the revenue sharing program is to aid state 
and local units of government by providing a direct repayment of a portion 
of the federal individual income tax receipts to those units of government. 
The program attempts to shift, at least partially, additional fiscal capa­
bility from the federal to state and local units of government. In addi­
tion, unlike the grant-in-aid programs, the local units of government are 
not encouraged to increase local taxing efforts in order to raise funds with 
which to match federal dollars under the general revenue sharing program. 
It was also felt that the transferring of funds was synonomous with 
the transferring of power from the national to the state and local levels of 
government. The term power relates to the ability of units of government to 
plan activities through their own financial decisions. Under the general 
revenue sharing program, state and local units of government are given more 
control over the expenditure of federal funds than they have previously been 
allowed under the other federal funding arrangements, such as the categorical 
grant-in-aid programs. 
Coupled with the many advantages of the general revenue sharing pro­
gram are also many problems which state and local units of government 
throughout the nation are inevitably going to face during the initial year 
of funding. Since this thesis is only considering the relationship between 
the revenue sharing program and local units of government, this chapter will 
discuss the anticipated problems which local units of government should en­
counter during the initial year of the general revenue sharing program. 
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Major Problem Areas 
The major problems and general hypotheses to be examined in this the­
sis are discussed in this section. The hypotheses are based on potential 
difficulties which could result during the initial year of the general reve­
nue sharing program. In order to conduct a valid analysis of the hypotheses, 
they were tested in various sizes of cities within a 60-mile radius of the 
city of Atlanta, Georgia. The cities tested include an equal distribution 
of large, intermediate and small sized communities. By grouping the cities 
in this manner, comparisons can be made among the various sized communities. 
In addition, since several of the hypotheses were not applicable to all 
sizes of cities, the groupings enable a valid test in only those areas which 
conform to the contention of each hypothesis. 
The hypotheses tested in this thesis are discussed as follows: 
(1) Localities which have adopted goals and objectives for community 
growth and development will have difficulty in implementing adopted programs 
due to the required use of funds for "priority expenditures" as defined by 
Subtitle A, Section 103 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 
1972. The hypothesis is based on the belief that most units of local gov­
ernment have placed their major planning emphasis in functional areas which 
are not consistent with the established "priority expenditures" contained in 
the act. 
(2) Revenue sharing funds will be used to finance short-term projects 
which can be completed in one year or less rather than for the initiation of 
long-term projects which would take several years to finance and complete 
(including those projects which could be undertaken in stages). The basis 
for this contention is the idea that the amount of revenue sharing funds 
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allocated to any one unit of local government will not be of a sufficient 
amount to influence the initiation of projects which would take several 
years to complete. Also, due to the recent cut-backs in federal grant-in-
aid programs, local officials are going to be reluctant to overextend them­
selves a second time. 
(3) Localities will attempt to use funds to finance activities other 
than the "priority expenditures" of the revenue sharing program in order to 
implement adopted programs and/or satisfy political aspirations and desires 
of the local citizenry and elected officials. This hypothesis was predi­
cated by the recent attempt by the City of Atlanta to distribute their allo­
cated revenue sharing funds to local citizens in the form of water fee re­
bates as a method of relieving tax burdens. Local speculation contends that 
the rebate attempt was predicated by the fact that a mayoral election was 
scheduled during the initial year of funding. 
(4) Localities affected by the recent cut-back in federal grant-in-
aid programs will favor the grant-in-aid system over the present revenue 
sharing arrangement. The basis for this contention is that many cities were 
receiving much more revenue from the federal grant-in-aid programs than they 
are now receiving from the general revenue sharing program. Only cities af­
fected by the cut-backs will be used to test this contention. 
(5) Localities will have difficulty in programming expenditures in 
order to fulfill the requirements of Subtitle B, Section 121 of the State 
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 unless they have an ongoing program 
for determining needed capital improvements. This section of the act re­
quires that the local units of government submit reports setting forth 
amounts and purposes for which revenue sharing funds will be obligated. 
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(6 ) L o c a l i t i e s w i l l f e e l t h a t the f u t u r e importance of the revenue 
s h a r i n g program i s c o n t i n g e n t upon the adopt ion of the proposed " s p e c i a l " 
revenue s h a r i n g program, which i s in tended t o r e p l a c e s e v e r a l of the p r e ­
v i o u s g r a n t - i n - a i d programs. This c o n t e n t i o n i s based on the b e l i e f t h a t 
l o c a l u n i t s of government w i l l not f e e l t h a t the p r e s e n t funds being a l l o ­
ca ted a r e of a s u f f i c i e n t amount t o o f f s e t the f i n a n c i a l burdens and needs 




In order to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter, it 
was necessary to undertake interviews with several units of local government 
which have received, spent, and/or obligated revenue sharing funds following 
the initial funding period of the general revenue sharing program. Due to 
the time limitations and complexity of such an undertaking, it was necessary 
to limit the interviews to a relatively well defined geographic area. The 
sample consisted of 15 cities within a 60-mile radius of the city of Atlanta, 
Georgia. In order to get a balanced view from the various types of communi­
ties, a broad spectrum of cities was selected. The selection of each city 
was based on the population, character, and geographic location of the com­
munity, and the amount of revenue sharing funds received during the initial 
funding period of the general revenue sharing program. 
The cities chosen for the analysis were grouped into large, inter­
mediate and small city classifications. This technique allowed the responses 
from each of the three groups to be examined independently, comparatively, 
and as one unit. Since several of the hypotheses did not apply to certain 
sizes of communities, the city classification allowed the interviews to con­
sider only applicable local units of government with the selected hypotheses. 
In addition, it was originally felt that the city size would have a direct 
relationship to the level of local financial expertise. However, this con­
tention did not prove correct in any of the cities interviewed. Each of the 
officials contacted was both aware of and concerned with the future growth 
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and development of his community, and quite knowledgeable of financial plan­
ning and budgeting. 
The localities interviewed and the amount of funds each received dur­
ing the initial funding period of the general revenue sharing program are as 
follows: 
Table 2. Localities Interviewed and the Amount of Funds 
Received During the Initial Funding Period of 
the General Revenue Sharing Program 
Amount of Funds City 
Locality Received* Classification 
(1) Atlanta $3,042,473 Large 
(2) DeKalb County 1,440,754 Large 
(3) Gwinnett County 301,962 Intermediate 
(4) Gainesville 176,617 Internediate 
(5) Marietta 119,453 Intermediate 
(6) East Point 82,265 Intermediate 
(7) Smyrna 63,818 Intermediate 
(8) Decatur 50,393 Intermediate 
(9) Douglasville 20,669 Small 
(10) Chamblee 18,216 Small 
(11) Lawrenceville 17,676 Small 
(12) Jonesboro 14,722 Small 
(13) Powder Springs 7,157 Small 
(14) Stone Mountain 6,439 Small 
(15) Alpharetta 3,936 Small 
*Amount of funds received for the first funding period (one-half year) of 
the general revenue sharing program. Funds were distributed in the month 




The results of the community interviews are presented in this chapter. 
Responses are used to test the contentions held by the thesis, and to derive 
conclusions as to the relationship between the revenue sharing program and 
local planning. 
The interviews were conducted between April 16 and May 10, 1973, 
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after each locality had committed its revenue sharing funds. Respondents 
included mayors, city managers, city clerks, financial officers, and other 
individuals who had administrative responsibility for the expenditure of lo­
cally allocated revenue sharing funds during the initial funding period of 
the general revenue sharing program. The 15 officials contacted for the in­
terviews were extremely cooperative, and gave their utmost attention and 
valuable time to completing the analysis. Since the revenue sharing program 
has been relatively well received, the officials were not reluctant to offer 
their opinions on the relationship of the program to local planning. Most 
of the officials interviewed knew a considerable amount about the revenue 
sharing program and have supported the concept of sharing federal funds with 
local units of government for some time. Thus, the information obtained 
from the interviews was extremely helpful in testing the validity of the 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis I contends that localities which have adopted goals and 
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objectives for community growth and development will have difficulty in im­
plementing adopted programs due to the required use of funds for "priority 
expenditures," as defined by Subtitle A, Section 103 of the State and Local 
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Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. The hypothesis is based on the belief that 
most units of local government have placed their major planning emphasis in 
functional areas which are not consistent with the established "priority 
expenditures" contained in the act. 
Information obtained from the interviews indicated that the amount of 
conflict between locally planned goals and objectives for community growth 
and development and the "priority expenditures" established by the State and 
Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 ranged from minimal to major following 
the initial funding period of the revenue sharing program. Of the 15 cities 
interviewed, 13 had adopted goals and objectives for community growth and 
development. The two communities which had not adopted goals and objectives 
were small cities. Of the 13 cities with goals and objectives, 10 indicated 
that the "priority expenditures" requirement of the general revenue sharing 
act was consistent with their locally adopted goals and objectives, while 
three felt that their major planning emphasis would have to be shifted in 
order to bring locally adopted goals and objectives into compliance with the 
"priority expenditures" requirement of the act. 
One city manager for an intermediate city indicated that his city 
used its revenue sharing funds for the financing of top priority expendi­
tures, as established by the city's Goals and Objectives Program. He felt 
that the revenue sharing program's "priority expenditures" were defined in 
such broad categories that the difficulty of compliance for the city--in 
terms of meeting its goals and objectives for community growth and develop­
ment --was minimal. 
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The chief administrative officer for one of the large cities indi­
cated that his community was able to satisfy several of its priority needs 
as well as satisfy the desires of several members of the Board of Aldermen 
with the expenditure of its initial revenue sharing funds. The city used 
approximately 40 percent of its funds for the initiation of projects recog­
nized as top priority by its Capital Improvements Program. The remaining 
60 percent of the funds were used to finance several projects deemed urgent 
in two of the city's wards by members of the Board of Aldermen. 
Although the majority of the cities interviewad did indicate that 
they were able to comply with the "priority expenditures" requirement of the 
act in such a manner as to satisfy planned goals and objectives for commu­
nity growth and development, several felt that the revenue sharing program 
was not capable of meeting their needs. A city manager for an intermediate 
city felt that his community would not be able to satisfy established needs 
by complying with the "priority expenditure" regulation of the act. The 
community is now in the process of adopting goals and objectives for the 
city with completion of the program expected in June 1973. Citizens are 
participating in the formulation of broad policy statements with which to 
direct future city programs. The manager stated that the area in which the 
citizens have voiced their greatest concern during the initial planning 
stages of the Goals and Objectives Program has been the area of improved ed­
ucational services, which is not an eligible "priority expenditure." In ad­
dition, local elected officials have indicated that one of their main 
concerns--in terms of local needs--is the retirement of the city's bond in­
debtedness, which is also an ineligible expenditure of general revenue 
sharing funds. Thus, in the case of one intermediate city, the established 
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"priority expenditures" requirement of the act will not satisfy the most 
urgent needs of the community, nor will they advance the satisfaction of 
locally adopted goals and objectives for community growth and development. 
Most of the cities interviewed indicated that although they ware able 
to satisfy their goals and objectives, the total impact of the revenue shar­
ing program on local development could be much more pronounced if no limita­
tions were placed on the expenditure of the funds. The clerk for one small 
city felt that the federal government, by not allowing his city a "free 
hand" with which to spend the allocated funds, was actually implying that 
the city does not have the ability nor initiative to undertake activities 
which will satisfy the needs of its community. He felt that the "priority 
expenditures" requirement was not needed due to the fact that if the needs of 
local citizens were not satisfied by the expenditure of funds, the political 
process would remove those individuals who ware responsible for the financial 
decisions, and replace them with officials who could better interpret the 
needs and desires of the populace. 
Thus, the majority of the cities interviewed felt that their adopted 
goals and objectives for community growth and development ware consistent 
with the "priority expenditures" requirement of the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972. Most officials felt that the requirements of the 
act were broad enough to meet the needs of their communities. However, the 
general feeling from all communities--large, intermediate and small—was 
that the general revenue sharing program could be. much more effective in 
their communities if the program had no limitations on the use of allocated 
funds. This opinion was not necessarily a reaction to the limitations of 
the present revenue sharing program, but a desire for greater local autonomy. 
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The cities felt that they were in the best position to determine local needs 
and that limitations on the use of funds should be directed from the level 
of government which can best satisfy the desires of its constituents, in 
terms of providing services. 
Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II states that revenue sharing funds will be used to fi­
nance short-term projects which can be completed in one year or less rather 
than for the initiation of long-term projects which would take several years 
to complete and finance (including those projects which could be undertaken 
in stages). The basis for this contention is the idea-that the amount of 
revenue sharing funds allocated to any one unit of government will not be of 
a sufficient amount to influence the initiation of projects which would take 
several years for completion. Also, due to the recent cut-backs in federal 
grant-in-aid programs, it is felt that local officials will be reluctant to 
overextend themselves a second time. 
Of the 15 cities interviewed, all but one city indicated that it 
would undertake short-term projects with general revenue sharing funds. The 
clerk for one of the small communities indicated that he would not be reluc­
tant to commit the city to a long-term loan for the construction of a new 
city hall. He felt that the facility could be financed through a conven­
tional loan and paid for within the five-year duration of the present gen­
eral revenue sharing program. He indicated, however, that the city council 
did not agree with this philosophy, and the city will undertake projects 
which can be completed within a relatively short period of time. 
The reasons given for not undertaking long-term projects with general 
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revenue sharing funds varied widely among cities interviewed. The city ad­
ministrator for another small city felt that his community should not con­
sider financing long-term projects with general revenue sharing funds because 
it would not be to the best advantage of the local government to be placed 
in a position of dependency on a federal program. He indicated that if his 
city initiated a particular program with its general revenue sharing funds, 
and the revenue sharing program was not continued after the initial five 
years, the city would be obligated to continue the program with locally col­
lected revenue, if the citizens desired. He felt this situation would re­
sult in not only unfinished projects, but, also, the destruction of citizens' 
confidence in federal and local government. 
The clerk for another small community indicated that his city would 
be reluctant to use the revenue sharing funds for projects which would take 
more than one year to complete since it would commit locally elected offi­
cials to certain courses of action. For example, if the city obligates its 
general revenue sharing funds for the construction of a new civic center 
which would require several years to finance, future elected officials would 
not be in a position to decide how revenue sharing funds should be spent 
since the funds had been previously committed. Thus, due to a pre-established 
policy of political courtesy, the use of general revenue sharing funds will 
be determined by locally elected officials on a year-by-year basis in this 
small community. 
The clerk for an intermediate sized city indicated that his community 
would not consider undertaking long-term projects with general revenue shar­
ing funds due to a fear of a potential property tax increase should the rev­
enue sharing program be terminated following the inital five years. For 
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example, if a new program which created several new jobs and was depended 
upon by the local citizens to perform a vital local function, was initiated 
with the revenue sharing funds, the termination of the new program would 
meet a tremendous amount of local opposition. Local officials would be re­
quired to seek new methods by which to continue the program in order to sat­
isfy the desires of the local populace. The only foreseeable solution would 
be an increase in the locally collected ad valorem tax which would result in 
an additional protest from other segments of the local population. Since 
the cost of undertaking new, long-term projects which could ultimately re­
sult in an increase in locally collected ad valorem taxes does not appear to 
yield a justifiable amount of both citizen and political benefits, short-
term projects will be undertaken with the general revenue sharing alloca­
tions in this intermediate city. 
An elected official for one large community indicated that its gener­
al revenue sharing funds will be used to finance "one-shot" projects which 
could be completed in a short period of time. The projects will be deter­
mined from a priority list, which is the method used for allocating all lo­
cal funds. He felt that it would not be in the best interest of the community 
to make long-term commitments due to the short duration of the revenue shar­
ing program. In addition, he felt it was not entirely unrealistic to assume 
that the revenue sharing program could be terminated prior to the 1976 dead­
line. 
Thus, most local officials have chosen to utilize their initial rev­
enue sharing funds for the initiation of short-term projects which can be 
financed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Large, intermediate, and small commu­
nities indicated that regardless of the amount of funds they received per 
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allocation, they would prefer to undertake activities with the general rev­
enue sharing funds which can be completed in a short period of time. The 
underlying justification for this action is a general distrust in the future 
continuation of the revenue sharing program. 
Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III contends that localities will attempt to alter the 
guidelines of the revenue sharing program in order to implement adopted pro­
grams and/or satisfy political aspirations and desires of the local citizenry 
and elected officials. This hypothesis was predicated by the recent attempt 
by the City of Atlanta to distribute its allocated revenue sharing funds to 
local citizens in the form of water fee rebates as a method of relieving tax 
burdens. The American Civil Liberties Union contested the use of funds in 
court, and the City of Atlanta was forced to abandon the allocation plan. 
It may be that the rebate attempt was predicated by the fact that a mayoral 
election was scheduled during the initial year of funding. 
This hypothesis was extremely difficult to test due to a general re­
luctance on the part of local officials to give any indication of falsifying 
the established guidelines of the general revenue sharing program. Only one 
city, Atlanta, had attempted to alter the guidelines of the act, and was 
forced by court order to divert the funds to more acceptable expenditures. 
However, indications are that the guidelines of the program did need altera­
tions if they were to meet the needs of local government. 
The city administrator for a small city indicated that the guidelines 
of the general revenue sharing program were simple enough to follow. How­
ever, the amount of "red tape" was still extremely time consuming. In order 
40 
to satisfy the reporting, legal, and numerous other requirements of the pro­
gram, he is required to take valuable time from other local problems. In 
the long run, he indicated, this situation will not be much different from 
that created by the categorical grant programs which require vast amounts of 
work in order to satisfy the requirements of the programs. He would like to 
see the reporting requirements of the program eliminated in order that the 
local administrator can spend more of his time solving urgent local issues, 
and, in turn, determining better ways in which to allocate local revenues. 
An elected official for a large community stated that the guidelines 
and amounts of revenue allocated by the general revenue sharing program were 
not meeting the community's most urgent needs. He indicated that local citi­
zens had voiced their desire for the general revenue sharing funds to be 
used in the areas of housing and welfare. However, the community's attorney 
indicated that these two categories of expenditure were not allowable under 
the present "priority expenditures" requirement of the State and Local Fis­
cal Assistance Act of 1972, which the elected official indicated the locality 
would assume as correct. In addition, he stated that the general revenue 
sharing program did not allocate sufficient revenue to the community for it 
to satisfy its most urgent need, which is an adequate storm drainage system 
throughout the area. 
The chief administrative officer for a large city felt that the guide­
lines of the general revenue sharing program were actually unlimited if the 
funds are used to free general fund monies. For example, if the locality 
desires to construct a low-income housing project, revenue sharing funds 
could be channeled into an eligible "priority expenditure" program which Was 
previously being financed by general funds--such as a city recreational 
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program--and the recreational funds could be used to finance the construc­
tion of the low-income housing units. 
Although most units of local government did not attempt to alter the 
guidelines of the program, several local units of government did find it 
difficult to comply with the established guidelines of the State and Local 
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. The guidelines were seen as cumbersome, lim­
iting, and not related to the immediate needs of local citizens. 
Hypothesis IV 
As stated by Hypothesis IV, localities affected by the recent cut­
back in federal grant-in-aid programs will favor the grant-in-aid system 
over the present revenue sharing arrangement. The basis for this contention 
is that many cities were receiving much more revenue from the federal grant-
in-aid programs than they are now receiving from the general revenue sharing 
program. Only cities affected by the cut-backs were used to test this con­
tention. 
Of the 15 cities interviewed, nine indicated that they had been di­
rectly affected by the recent cut-backs in several federal grant-in-aid 
programs. Two large, three intermediate, and two small sized communities 
indicated that they preferred the present general revenue sharing programs 
over the terminated grant-in-aid programs. One intermediate and one small 
city preferred the categorical grant-in-aid programs. 
An elected official for one large community indicated that his com­
munity would lose a considerable amount of federal aid due to the cut-backs 
in several categorical grant-in-aid programs. However, he preferred the 
general revenue sharing program even though it would mean less aid. He felt 
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that the revenue sharing methodology, by allowing local units of government 
to administer their own expenditure decisions, would allow the communities 
to spend the funds more wisely than by allowing federal agencies to desig­
nate areas for the expenditure of funds. In addition, he felt that by allow­
ing localities to design their own development programs, local needs of the 
entire population can be more easily satisfied. 
The city manager for an intermediate sized city indicated that his 
city had lost urban renewal, housing and potential open space projects due 
to the recent cut-backs in federal grant-in-aid programs. He felt that the 
dollar loss of these numerous projects would not be equaled by the present 
general revenue sharing program, but that the ease of administering the gen­
eral revenue sharing program made up for the loss in total funds. In addi­
tion, he felt that the general revenue sharing program would result in much 
more worthwhile projects due to the fact that development decisions were now 
retained by the local level of government. 
The city administrator for one small city also supported the present 
general revenue sharing program. He indicated that his community had antic­
ipated receiving funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
for open space development and the construction of water and sewer facili­
ties. He felt that the city could have potentially received more funds from 
the HUD programs, but that he preferred the present general revenue sharing 
program due to the "no strings" character of the program. The general rev­
enue sharing program will be much more responsive to the needs and desires 
of the local citizens, he indicated. 
As for the cities which preferred the grant-in-aid programs, the 
clerk for a small community indicated that his city was expecting funds for 
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the extension of city water and sewer facilities prior to the termination of 
the grant-in-aid programs. Also, the city anticipated receiving additional 
open space funds for the completion of the city's recreational program. The 
clerk indicated that his city was in a position to receive substantially 
more revenue under the grant-in-aid program than they are now receiving un­
der the general revenue sharing program. Thus, he preferred the grant-in-
aid system over the general revenue sharing program. 
A city manager for an intermediate sized city indicated that his city 
was severely affected by the recent cut-backs in categorical grant-in-aid 
programs. The city lost approximately $345,000 under one HEW program, and 
will lose much more revenue due to the termination of presently funded and 
potential urban renewal, housing, water and sewer, and open space projects. 
He indicated that the city was well accustomed to the application procedures 
and requirements of the numerous categorical grant-in-aid programs, and, 
thus, had no difficulty in completing the requirements of the programs. 
Thus, the majority of the large, intermediate, and small cities which 
have been affected by the recent cut-backs in federal grant-in-aid programs 
prefer the general revenue sharing program rather than the terminated grant 
programs. Due to the many detailed requirements of the grant-in-aid pro­
grams, local officials feel that they are required to spend an excessive 
amount of time in order to qualify for the funds. Under the revenue sharing 
program, local administrators have more time with which to plan for the use 
of funds rather than planning how to get more revenue from the program. In 
addition, it is felt that the general revenue sharing program will allow lo­
cal officials to plan and implement projects that can best satisfy the needs 
of local residents, rather than having governmental agencies dictate policy. 
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Even though the amount of funds under the general revenue sharing 
program is not equal to the amount of aid that the local units of government 
could have potentially received under the grant-in-aid system, they are sat­
isfied with the. revenue sharing program since it will grant more local auton­
omy . 
Hypothesis V 
Hypothesis V contends that localities will have difficulty in pro­
gramming expenditures in order to fulfill the requirements of Subtitle B, 
Section 121 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 J unless 
they have an ongoing program for programming needed capital improvements. 
This section of the act requires that the local units of government submit 
reports setting forth amounts and purposes for which revenue sharing funds 
will be obligated. 
Each of the 15 large, intermediate, and small sized cities indicated 
that they did have an established method by which to program needed capital 
improvements, and felt that it would not be difficult to submit a report 
setting forth the use of future general revenue sharing funds. In addition, 
all cities interviewed supported the need to plan for the use of local funds 
in terms of satisfying the most urgent needs of their communities. 
The clerk for one small city indicated that the degree of difficulty 
in completing a long-range plan for the use of revenue sharing funds would 
depend on the ability of the city council to recognize the importance of the 
planning process in local financial decisions„ The city does not have an 
established comprehensive planning program at this time. It is in the proc­
ess of completing a future land use plan. However, financial planning and 
45 
capital improvements programming will not be included in the plan. The 
clerk indicated that the future use of general revenue sharing funds could 
be programmed for a five-year period, but the significance of the task would 
depend on the ability of the document to withstand the changing views of the 
local populace and local elected officials. Thus, he does not foresee dif­
ficulty in stating community needs in terms of a five-year schedule, but 
does anticipate a problem in convincing local officials of the need to fol­
low a plan for the future growth and development of the city. 
The clerk for an intermediate city also indicated that his community 
did not have an ongoing program for programming capital improvements. The 
city bases its financial decisions on established priorities and determines 
the allocation of revenue on a year-by-year basis. He indicated the city 
would not have difficulty in planning for the use of general revenue sharing 
funds for the first two years of the program without a comprehensive plan­
ning program. However, after the initial priority activities are completed, 
future accountability for the funds will become essential. A formal, on­
going planning program appears to be the best solution to the problem of de­
termining the future use of the funds, he stated. 
The financial director for an intermediate community indicated that 
the planning function and the determination of financial expenditures are 
not closely related in the operations of the local government. He felt that 
it would be extremely beneficial for the two programs to coordinate their 
activities in order to establish a method by which to combine the future 
needs of the community with the resources to implement plans. He felt that 
the planning process could greatly assist his office in determining the most 
appropriate areas for the expenditure of the general revenue sharing funds. 
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He indicated that the planning process would allow the money to be spent for 
the most urgent needs of the community. By combining tha planning process 
and the operations of the financial department, their ability to plan for 
the future use of both general funds and revenue sharing funds would be en­
hanced . 
Thus, it was determined from the interviews that the ability of local 
government to plan for the future use of general revenue sharing funds could 
be enhanced by an ongoing planning program for assessing community needs. 
Without such a planning program, the ability to account for the expenditure 
of funds will become much more difficult as additional general revenue shar­
ing funds are received. This opinion was held by large, intermediate, and 
small sized communities. 
Hypothesis VI 
As stated by Hypothesis VI, localities will feel that the future im­
portance of the revenue sharing program is contingent upon the adoption of 
the proposed "special" revenue sharing program, which is intended to replace 
several of the previous grant-in-aid programs. This contention is based on 
the belief that local units of government will not feel that the present 
funds being allocated are of a sufficient amount to offset the financial 
burdens and needs of most communities. 
Each of the 15 cities interviewed felt that the future importance of 
the revenue sharing concept--in terms of solving local financial burdens--
was contingent upon the allocation of additional funds. If the proposed 
"special" revenue sharing program returns more "unstringed" federal dollars 
to the local level of government, the inevitable result will be the enhancement 
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and fulfillment of the concept of allowing local units of government to plan 
and implement their own futures through local financial decisions. 
The mayor of one small city indicated that the present funding of the 
general revenue sharing program was not enough to solve the financial prob­
lems of his city. The future funds, he felt, will not even be able to keep 
pace with inflation if additional revenue is not allocated to the program. 
He felt that the proposed "special" revenue sharing program would help his 
city if it channels more revenue to the local level of government with no 
more internal restrictions on the use of the funds than are presently re­
quired by the general revenue sharing program. 
The chief administrative officer for a large city indicated that the 
present amount of general revenue sharing funds accounted for only about six 
percent of his total city budget. He felt that in order for the program to 
have any dramatic impact on the financial burdens of his community, the pro­
gram would need a substantial boost in the annual allocations to the local 
level of government. In addition, he felt that the proposed "special" rev­
enue sharing program could enhance the future of the program if the grants 
are substantially greater than the amount of funds which the city lost due 
to the recent cut-backs in several federal categorical grant programs. If 
the funds do not at least equal the categorical grant-in-aid funds, he added, 
"special" revenue sharing may actually contribute to the total financial 
problems of the city of Atlanta. 
The clerk for an intermediate city indicated that the city's present 
general revenue sharing allocations would be adequate if the growth and de­
velopment of the community were stagnant. However, the city is beginning to 
experience the pressures of urban growth generated by the City of Atlanta. 
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As greater numbers of people move from the city of Atlanta into his commu­
nity, the demand for more and better services increases. In order for the 
city to keep abreast of the constantly increasing demand for better govern­
mental services, the local financial receipts of the community must be in­
creased. He felt that the constant growth and demands of the local populace 
could not be satisfied by the present amount of general revenue sharing 
funds allocated to his city. However, he added, it is anticipated that the 
proposed "special" revenue sharing program will assist the city in meeting 
the future service demands of the local citizens if the program allocates 
the same amount of funds that were requested from several of the terminated 
categorical grant programs. 
Thus, as previously stated, each of the 15 large, intermediate, and 
small cities felt that the future success of the revenue sharing concept was 
contingent upon an increase in the amount of funds allocated to each unit of 
local government. Since the present general revenue sharing allocations are 
accounting for only a small percentage of most local budgets, the funds are 
not allowing the lower levels of government to offset a substantial amount 
of their greatest financial needs. In order for localities to relieve the 
financial burdens of the future, greater assistance from the federal govern­
ment will be essential. 
Summary of Interviews 
As seen in Table 3, Hypotheses II, V, and VI were supported by the 
cities interviewed, while Hypotheses I, III, and IV did not receive the sup­
port of local officials. 
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Table 3. Interview Results 
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Although the cities interviewed did not agree with the contentions held by 
three of the hypotheses, the responses obtained in testing these hypotheses 
were extremely beneficial to the analysis of the relationship between rev­
enue sharing and local planning. 
Hypothesis I contended that localities which had adopted goals and 
objectives for community growth and development would have difficulty in im­
plementing adopted programs due to the required use of funds for "priority 
expenditures," as defined by Subtitle A, Section 103 of the State and Local 
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. Information obtained from the interviews in­
dicated that the amount of conflict between locally planned goals and objec­
tives for community growth and development and the "priority expenditures" 
ranged from minimal to major following the initial funding period of the 
revenue sharing program. Of the 15 cities interviewed, 13 had adopted goals 
and objectives for community growth and development. Of these 13 cities, 10 
indicated that the "priority expenditures" requirement of the general rev­
enue sharing act was consistent with their locally adopted goals and objec­
tives, while three felt that their major planning emphasis would have to be 
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shifted in order to bring locally adopted goals and objectives into compli­
ance with the "priority expenditures" requirement of the act. Most offi­
cials felt that the requirements of the act were broad enough to meet the 
needs of their communities. However, the general feeling from all commu-
nities--large, intermediate and small--was that the general revenue sharing 
program could be much more effective in their communities if the program had 
no limitations on the use of allocated funds. This opinion was not neces­
sarily a reaction to the limitations of the present revenue sharing program, 
but a desire for greater local autonomy. 
Hypothesis II stated that revenue sharing funds would be used to fi­
nance short-term projects which could be completed in one year or less rath­
er than for the initiation of long-term projects which could take several 
years to complete and finance (including those projects which could be under­
taken in stages). Of the 15 cities interviewed, all but one city indicated 
that they would undertake short-term projects with general revenue sharing 
funds. Large, intermediate, and small sized communities indicated that re­
gardless of the amount of funds they received per allocation, they would 
prefer to undertake activities with the general revenue sharing funds which 
could be completed in one year or less. The underlying justification for 
this action was a general distrust in the future continuation of the revenue 
sharing program. 
As stated by Hypothesis III, localities would attempt to alter the 
guidelines of the revenue sharing program in order to implement adopted pro­
grams and/or satisfy political aspirations and desires of the local citizenry 
and elected officials. This hypothesis was extremely difficult to test due 
to a general reluctance on the part of local officials to give any indication 
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of falsifying the established guidelines of the general revenue sharing pro­
gram. Only one city, the City of Atlanta, had attempted to alter the guide­
lines of the act. This city was forced by court order to divert the funds 
to more acceptable expenditures. However, indications ware that the guide­
lines of the program did need alterations if they ware to meet the needs of 
local government. The guidelines were, seen as cumbersome, limiting, and not 
related to the immediate needs of local citizens. 
Hypothesis IV stated that localities affected by the recent cut-backs 
in several federal grant-in-aid programs would favor the grant-in-aid system 
over the present revenue sharing arrangement. Of the 15 cities interviewed, 
nine indicated that they had been directly affected by the cut-backs in sev­
eral grant-in-aid programs. Two large, three intermediate, and two small 
sized communities indicated that they preferred the present general revenue 
sharing program over the terminated grant-in-aid programs. One intermediate 
and one small sized city preferred the categorical grant-in-aid programs. 
As a result of the many detailed requirements of the grant-in-aid programs, 
local officials feel that they are required to spend an excessive amount of 
time in order to qualify for the funds. Under the revenue sharing program, 
local administrators have more time with which to plan for the use of funds 
rather than planning how to get more revenue from the program. In addition, 
it is felt that the general revenue sharing program will allow local offi­
cials to plan and implement projects that can bast satisfy the needs of the 
local residents, rather than having governmental agencies dictate policy as 
is the case under the grant-in-aid system. Even though the amount of funds 
under the general revenue sharing program is not equal to the amount of aid 
that the local units of government could have potentially received under the 
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grant-in-aid system, they are satisfied with the revenue sharing program 
since it will grant more local autonomy. 
Hypothesis V contended that localities would have difficulty in pro­
gramming expenditures in order to fulfill the requirements of Subtitle B, 
Section 121 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 unless they 
had an ongoing program for programming needed capital improvements. Each of 
the 15 large, intermediate, and small sized cities interviewed indicated 
that they did have an established method by which to program needed capital 
improvements, and felt that it would not be difficult to submit a report 
setting forth the use of future general revenue sharing funds. In addition, 
all cities interviewed supported the need to plan for the use of local funds 
in terms of satisfying the most urgent needs of their communities. It was 
felt that the ability of local government to plan for the future use of gen­
eral revenue sharing funds could be enhanced by an ongoing planning program. 
Without such a planning program, the ability to account for the expenditures 
of funds will become much more difficult as additional revenue sharing funds 
are received. 
Finally, Hypothesis VI stated that localities would feel that the fu­
ture importance of the revenue sharing program was contingent upon the adop­
tion of the proposed "special" revenue sharing program, which is intended to 
replace several of the previous grant-in-aid programs. Each of the 15 cities 
interviewed felt that the future importance of the revenue sharing concept--
in terms of solving local financial burdens--was contingent upon the alloca­
tion of additional funds. Since the present general revenue sharing alloca­
tions are accounting for only a small percentage of most local budgets, the 
funds are not allowing the lower levels of government to offset a substantial 
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amount of t h e i r g r e a t e s t f i n a n c i a l n e e d s . In o r d e r f o r l o c a l i t i e s t o r e ­
l i e v e the f i n a n c i a l burdens of the f u t u r e , g r e a t e r a s s i s t a n c e from the fed 




Tha general revenue sharing program, following its initial year of 
operation, can be considered a major step toward granting power to the local 
levels of government. By transferring funds with relatively few limitations 
on their use, the federal government is actually giving the local units of 
government a vote of confidence in their ability to determine the needs of 
their constituents. In addition, the stimulus for more and better local 
planning is provided by the general revenue sharing program since local 
units of government are granted funds to undertake needed activities without 
being forced to accept federal criteria as a guide to their implementation. 
The general revenue sharing program, by placing few limitations on 
the use of funds, has granted more autonomy to the local units of government. 
As indicated by the community interviews, even though the revenue sharing 
program will mean fewer federal dollars in some communities than they could 
potentially have received under the grant-in-aid system, they are satisfied 
to accept the general revenue sharing program since it will allow them a 
stronger voice in the use of allocated funds. In addition, contrary to the 
controls which the federal government administered under the grant-in-aid 
programs, the general revenue sharing program allows local units of govern­
ment much more authority in determining the use of allocated funds. The 
only required use of the funds is that they must be spent for certain "prior­
ity expenditures" established by the general revenue sharing act. According 
to the community interviews, the eligible uses are broad enough to cover 
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almost any need of a local unit of government. 
The general revenue sharing program also allows local governments to 
undertake projects which will satisfy the most urgent needs of the community, 
rather than yield a greater matching federal dollar from Washington. As was 
the case with the grant-in-aid programs, communities which had approved fed­
eral projects were almost forced to channel their locally collected revenue 
into the grant-in-aid programs in order to obtain a maximum degree of sup­
port from the federal government. The result of this overdependence on the 
matching funds was that many communities were placing so much of their rev­
enue in projects which would benefit only a certain functional area of local 
concern that other needed activities were being disregarded. Under the gen­
eral revenue sharing program, local units of government will not be required 
to match federal dollars, which will allow them to consider local desires in 
terms of satisfying needs rather than matching dollars. 
The general revenue sharing program will also assist the federal gov­
ernment in attempting to fulfill its responsibility for insuring that there 
is an equitable distribution of services throughout the entire nation. This 
principle is the foundation of intergovernmental fiscal relations. By allo­
cating the revenue sharing funds on the basis of population and tax effort, 
funds are distributed on an equitable basis throughout the country, and sup­
ply those areas which are least able to afford major tax increases with cap­
ital to finance needed local services without demanding increases in locally 
collected revenues. 
In addition to the many attributes of the general revenue sharing 
program, there are also several areas in which improvements will have to be 
made if the program is to stimulate a need for local planning. 
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If local units of government are to comply with their goals and ob­
jectives for community growth and development, the "priority expenditures" 
requirement of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 must be 
broadened to include additional functional areas of community needs. The 
proposed "special" revenue sharing program may provide the needed boost to 
the total array of "priority expenditures." HDwever, if the proposed pro­
gram ignores the areas of housing, education, and other major capital items, 
the total impact of the revenue sharing concept, in terms of satisfying pre­
planned goals and objectives for community growth and development, will be 
greatly hampered. 
Every local unit of government desires to satisfy the needs of its 
populace without demanding tremendous increases in locally collected revenue. 
As a result, many needed services are furnished at inadequate levels in or­
der to place fewer demands on the citizens of tha community. Most of the 
service naeds of a city require such tremendous capital outlays that they 
cannot be undertaken on a short-term basis. The services must be financed, 
and in many cases constructed, over a long period of time. As indicated by 
the interviews conducted for this thesis, local officials are reluctant to 
undertake long-term projects with general revenue sharing funds due to their 
general distrust in the future continuation of the revenue sharing programs. 
This feeling of doubt is partly based on the recent cut-backs in several 
categorical grant programs. 
If the federal government intends to establish a stronger federal-
state relationship through the revenue sharing concept, the support and 
trust of the local levels of government must be regained. The federal gov­
ernment must assure the localities that they can depend on the future 
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allocation of funds in order that the communities can plan and initiate 
long-term projects to be financed from the annual general revenue sharing 
receipts. 
The guidelines of the general revenue sharing program are relatively 
unlimited; however, local units of government should be trusted to an ex­
tent that guidelines—other than those which assure the avoidance of fraud-
are not needed. If local units of government are to feel that they are 
being given greater control over their own destinies, the guidelines of the 
general revenue sharing program should be revised in such a manner as to al­
low localities to spend less time completing forms, and more time examining 
future needs through planned activities. 
Local units of government must realize that proper fiscal planning is 
the only justifiable method by which to determine the future financial needs 
of the community. Since public awareness and the mass media are constantly 
demanding accountability for governmental action, the establishment of and 
reliance on a sound planning program by which to determine the use of gener­
al revenue sharing funds must be initiated. The formality of such a program 
will be directly related to the size and complexity of governmental opera­
tions. However, regardless of the magnitude of local demands, the planning 
and budgeting process can greatly assist the community in undertaking proj­
ects which will satisfy the most urgent needs of the local populace. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVENUE SHARING 
PROGRAM FOR LOCAL PLANNING 
The future implications of the general revenue sharing program for 
local planning should be to stimulate both a need and an awareness of the 
necessity to properly program the use of city funds. Following the comple­
tion of "one-shot" projects which local political officials feel they must 
undertake in order to satisfy their immediate desires and/or the desires of 
their political supporters, a justified method by which to account for the 
expenditure of local revenue sharing funds will ultimately be demanded. 
The general awareness of a need to plan for the future growth and de­
velopment of the city has been evolving for some time at the local level of 
government. However, the actual stimulus with which to initiate the plan­
ning concept has been overshadowed by short-range city needs and desires of 
elected officials and constituent political factions. Also, due to the fact 
that the financing of most major improvements and projects requires either 
an increase in locally collected taxes or long-term financing to which most 
local officials are reluctant to commit a city, officials have been reluc­
tant to look beyond the scope of one or two years into the future. The gen­
eral revenue sharing program, although it accounts for only a small percent­
age of most local budgets, should act as a catalyst for the initiation of 
long-term, comprehensive planning since the program will provide additional 
funds with which to implement plans, without requiring either major tax in­
creases or long-term financial commitments in the form of general obligation 
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and revenue bond issuances. Also, since accountability for the expenditure 
of revenue sharing funds is required by the guidelines of the program, the 
planning process appears to be the most logical mechanism by which to coor­
dinate local needs with the expenditure of funds. 
The revenue sharing program will stimulate new ideas and, in turn, 
new approaches to planning for local needs. Since the revenue sharing pro­
gram contains only a minimal amount of external limitations and no internal 
restrictions on the use of allocated funds, a considerable amount of flexi­
bility in designing local programs will be offered. Planners, if supported 
by local officials, can design programs which meet the exact needs of a 
given community, contrary to any established norm dictated by a higher level 
of government. 
Since locally elected officials will be held accountable for the ex­
penditure of allocated revenue sharing funds, they will rely much more heav­
ily on assessing the desires of local residents, and planning programs to 
meet these needs. Under other forms of federal funding, local officials 
could always point a finger to Washington if projects were not successful. 
However, since the revenue sharing program allows the local units of govern­
ment to determine the use of allocated funds, it will not be as easy to put 
the blame on the higher level of government. Thus, local officials will be 
persuaded to initiate activities based on sound planning criteria if they 
intend to justify their financial decisions. 
Thus, once and for all, planners can expect to attain the true goal 
of planning, which is to accomplish that which has been planned. General 
revenue sharing, as well as "special" revenue sharing, will offer the city 
planner an entirely new avenue of challenge by providing funds within a 
framework of local autonomy. 
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APPENDIX 
On the following pages appears the Interview Questionnaire used in 
the field interviews conducted for this thesis. 
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REVENUE SHARING AND LOCAL PLANNING: THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE 
Interview Questionnaire 
The following questions are structured in such a manner as to test 
the validity of several hypotheses proposed in the thesis. 
Hypothesis I 
1. Does your city currently have a comprehensive planning program? 
2. Has your city adopted goals and objectives for community growth and de­
velopment? 
3. Due to the requirement that funds must be spent on,"priority expendi­
tures," were you able to spend your revenue sharing funds in such a manner 
as to stay within the prescribed areas recognized by your established goals 
and objectives? 
4. If the "priority expenditures" established by the Act were not consis­
tent with the established goals and objectives for community growth and de­
velopment, how has the revenue sharing program affected the established 
goals and objectives for your community? 
Hypothesis II 
1. Were your revenue sharing funds used for the financing of ongoing pro­
grams or for the financing of new capital improvements? 
2. Why were the funds used in the particular manner in which they were 
used? 
3. Would you be reluctant to use the funds for undertaking long-term proj­
ects which would take several years to complete and pay for? Why? 
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Hypothesis III 
1. Did you have difficulty in following and/or understanding the guidelines 
of the Act? If yes, in what way? 
2. Ware you able to follow the guidelines of the program in such a manner 
as to complete or undertake projects which were considered to be of the ut­
most importance to your community? 
3. If the guidelines of the program were altered, what were the reasons for 
such action? 
4. Do you feel that the guidelines of the program should be altered in or­
der to meet the needs of your community? If yes, in what ways? 
Hypothesis IV 
1. Was your city affected by the recent cut-backs in the federal grant-in-
aid programs? 
2. Approximately how much money has your city lost due to the recent cut­
backs in the federal grant-in-aid programs? 
3. In comparing the amount of money your city was receiving under the grant-
in-aid system or the amount that you anticipate that you could have received 
if the programs had not been terminated with the amount of money which you 
are now receiving under the general revenue sharing program, which system of 
federal allocations do you favor? Why? 
Hypothesis V 
1. Does your city have an established method by which to program or distrib­
ute funds for various categories of expenditures within the community? 
2. What method is now used to determine the allocation of revenue for needed 
expenditures? 
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3. What method do you use or do you intend to use in programming the ex­
penditure of revenue sharing funds? Why? 
5. Do you foresee any difficulty in devising an adequate method by which to 
allocate the revenue sharing funds? 
6. Do you anticipate any difficulties in complying with Subtitle B, Section 
121 of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 which requires each 
locality that is receiving revenue sharing funds to submit a report setting 
forth amounts and purposes for which revenue sharing funds will be obligated 
prior to receiving such funds? 
7. Do you feel that a formal, ongoing planning program would assist your 
community in completing the report and, in turn, determining sound programs 
in which to invest the available revenue sharing funds? 
Hypothesis VI 
1. Do you feel that the current revenue sharing program will remove the fi­
nancial burdens of your community? 
2. Do you feel that the program will need additional funds in the future if 
the program is to be effective in your community? 
3. What contribution do you feel the proposed "Special Revenue Sharing" 
will make to the total impact of the revenue sharing program? 
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Quarterly Weekly Report, January 2 8 , 1 9 7 1 , p. 2 1 3 . 
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ticle in Annual Editions: Readings In American Government ' 7 2 - ' 7 3 (Kings -
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Revenue Shar­
ing — An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1970)", p. 10." 
26 
U.S. Congress, An Act To Provide Fiscal Assistance, pp. 1 - 2 9 . 
27 
Information included in this section was obtained directly from the 
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1 9 7 2 , Public Law 9 2 - 5 1 2 . 
28 
Joe Hatcher, "Revenue Sharing Just a Mirage? Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, February 2 5 , 1 9 7 3 , p. 2Co 
Revenue Sharing: Greater Latitude For the States," Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report. September 2 , 1 9 7 2 , p. 2 2 4 1 . 
30 
Due, Government Finance, p. 3 1 9 . 
Mel Powell, General Revenue Sharing: New Resources and New Respon­
sibilities for State and Local Governments," Article in Appalachia, 
February-March, 1 9 7 3 , p. 5 0 . 
32 
Information obtained from an interview with Mr. W. G. Bernhardt, Di­
rector of the Tullahoma Community Development and Housing Commission, Tulla-
homa, Tennessee, on April 1 6 , 1 9 7 3 . 
33 
Information in this chapter was obtained from interviews with offi­
cials responsible for the allocation of the initial revenue sharing funds in 
localities within a 60-mile radius of the city of Atlanta, Georgia. Those 
individuals interviewed and the date of each interview is listed as follows: 
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Mr. Sidney Dees, Mayor for the City of Alpharetta, Georgia, May 10, 
1973. 
Mr. Ge#rge Berry, Chief Administrative Officer for the City of At­
lanta, Georgia, April 24, 1973. 
Mr. W. B. Malone, Mayor for the City of Chamblee, Georgia, April 17, 
1973. 
Mr. Robert G. Mauney, City Manager for the City of Decatur, Georgia, 
April 17, 1973. 
Mr. Bob Guhl, Chairman of the DeKalb County Board-of Commissioners, 
DeKalb County, Georgia, April 30, 1973. 
Mr. Cecil Banks, Clerk for the City of Douglasville, Georgia, 
April 25, 1973. 
Mr. Walter P. Kidd, Clerk for the City of East Point, Georgia, 
April 25, 1973. 
Mr. Ray Keith, City Manager for the City of Gainesville, Georgia, 
May 4, 1973. 
Mayor Hugh Dickson, Mayor for the City of Jonesboro, Georgia, May 8, 
1973. 
Xr. Hugh H. Howell, III, City Administrator for the City of Lawrence-
ville, Georgia, April 26, 1973. 
Mr. Gene Miller, City Manager for the City of Marietta, Georgia, 
April 24, 1973. 
Mr. Bill Leachman, Clerk for the City of Powder Springs, Georgia, 
April 25, 1973. 
Mr. L. W. Charles, Clerk for the City of Smyrna, Georgia, April 26, 
1973. 
Mr. Randolph Madlock, Mayor for the City of Stone Mountain, Georgia, 
May 1, 1973. 
+U.S. Congress, An Act To Provide Fiscal Assistance, pp. 1-29. 
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